Retrievable Images on Social Media Platforms: A Call for a New Privacy Tort by Takhshid, Zahra
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 68 Number 1 Article 3 
1-1-2020 
Retrievable Images on Social Media Platforms: A Call for a New 
Privacy Tort 
Zahra Takhshid 
Harvard Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Privacy Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zahra Takhshid, Retrievable Images on Social Media Platforms: A Call for a New Privacy Tort, 68 Buff. L. 
Rev. 139 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol68/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
 
139 
Buffalo Law Review 
VOLUME 68 JANUARY 2020 NUMBER 1 
Retrievable Images on Social Media 
Platforms: A Call for a New Privacy Tort 
ZAHRA TAKHSHID† 
The recognition of a right of privacy in Warren and 
Brandeis’s famous article has long been celebrated and 
lamented. It is celebrated because privacy is a central feature 
of individual well-being that deserves legal protection. It is 
lamented because the protection they contemplated, and that 
is actually provided by the law, is quite modest. Modern 
technology, especially social media platforms, has only raised 
the stakes. Anytime one goes out in public, one risks having 
one’s image captured and shared worldwide, leaving us with 
little or no control over how we are perceived by others. 
This Article argues for the recognition of a new privacy 
tort: the tort of unwanted broadcasting. It would allow a 
person whose image is, without permission, shared widely on 
one or more social media platforms that has an enduring 
retrievable character, to recover damages from a person who 
posts it. While in some respects novel and far-reaching, the 
unwanted broadcasting tort has a solid grounding in privacy 
 
† Reginald F. Lewis Fellow for Law Teaching, Harvard Law School. For helpful 
comments and conversations, I am grateful to Benjamin C. Zipursky, Vincent 
Blasi, John C.P. Goldberg, Clare Huntington, Amelia J. Uelmen, Olivier Sylvain, 
Toni Jaeger-Fine, Randall L. Kennedy, Emory Law S.J.D. Society, participants 
of the Yale Law School Information Society Project 7th Annual Freedom of 
Expression Scholars Conference April 2019, Susannah Barton Tobin, and the 
2019 Climenko Fellows. 
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theory and doctrinal roots in English case law. This Article 
also shows that this tort can be fashioned in a manner that 
renders it consistent with First Amendment principles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are in a café enjoying a cup of coffee when 
you notice the person sitting at a nearby table is staring at 
you. The individual pulls out a cellphone and takes a picture 
of you. Before you know it, the individual is posting those 
pictures on her social media platform which has a large 
audience. Unless you are a public figure who is accustomed 
to desired or even undesired attention, you most likely do not 
enjoy being the subject in this scenario. You may choose to 
either ignore the individual or give up on that coffee and 
leave the café. But leaving the café won’t help you from being 
in similar situations as long as you remain in a public space. 
You inevitably have a lower expectation of privacy in public; 
after all, “the timorous may stay at home.”1 But does that 
mean you have to consent to your picture becoming available 
online and expect to be watched by a thousand followers on 
a stranger’s social media account for an indefinite time by 
choosing to be in a public space? The minute the individual 
posts your picture on their public social media profile, the 
nature of your presence in public changes: it is now a 
retrievable visibility that can haunt you for years to come 
and have many unwanted consequences.  
Today, the novel ways that third parties can take 
advantage of a simple photo are alarming.2 A New York 
Times report on a start-up company called Clearview AI 
neatly illustrates this point. Clearview AI accumulated 
millions of publicly available pictures of people online to 
build up a facial recognition app that would allow the users 
to identify strangers. Anyone can simply take a picture of a 
stranger walking down the street and upload that image on 
the app. The app would then use its database to identify that 
stranger. While the use of the app has thus far been limited, 
 
 1. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929). 
 2. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We 
Know It (Jan 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/ 
clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
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it may be soon that similar apps become available to the 
public. The app has heavily relied on social media platforms 
to collect images. One may argue that the photo scrapping 
used by Clearview AI is against the terms of services of 
Facebook. However, such violations may keep recurring 
regardless of what companies’ terms of services state. 
Furthermore, despite the ban on facial recognition 
technology in a number of U.S. cities, such as San Francisco,3 
the future of the technology is opaque. New ways of using 
publicly available images as data can and will become 
available. While we can think of ways to address each new 
technology as it emerges, the legal system should grant the 
privacy of not having any picture online if an individual 
chooses so. 
This Article asks whether choosing not to have your 
picture available online in general, and specifically on social 
media platforms, is a protected privacy interest that should 
allow individuals to sue for damages when their image has 
been intentionally widely broadcasted on social media 
platforms without their consent. The Article argues that the 
answer is yes. The harm of such image dissemination online 
is retrievable visibility that is not addressed by the current 
mainstream common law privacy torts. 
Unease with unwanted enduring effects of photography 
is not new. In 2009, one member of Congress introduced a 
bill that would have mandated a clicking sound to serve as a 
notice to persons that they are being photographed.4 Some 
 
 3. Kate Conger, Richard Fausset, and Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco 
Bans Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html; see 
also  Bruce Schneier, We’re Banning Facial Recognition. We’re Missing the Point, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/opinion/facial-
recognition-ban-privacy.html. 
 4. Camera Predator Alert Act of 2009, H.R. 414, 111th Cong. (2009). The act 
would have required “any mobile phone containing a digital camera” to “sound a 
tone . . . whenever a photograph is taken with the camera in such phone.” Id. The 
act would have further prohibited such a phone from being “equipped with a 
means of disabling or silencing such tone or sound.” Id. 
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have suggested using an app that would immediately emit a 
flash “when sensing a camera lens, thereby ruining the 
image.”5 The impracticality of such proposals forces us to 
look at the growing body of scholarly literature that focuses 
on similar online privacy concerns involving images: scholars 
have recognized the phenomenon of widespread video 
recording (especially citizen recording v. professional 
journalism) and its potential for generating privacy 
violations.6 One author called for recognizing a tort of 
objectification of crime spectators in light of widespread 
video recording of crime scenes, 7 while another introduced a 
tort for the misuse of personal information.8 Scholarship has 
also focused on online shaming and the importance of laws 
 
 5. Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More than a Thousand Posts: Developing 
Face Recognition Privacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 168, 225 
(2012). 
 6. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, Recording as Heckling, 108 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=3344815) (citing Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. 
L. REV. 167, 175–76 (2017)) (noting that Kaminski advocated that “recording’s 
situated, physical privacy harms be balanced against recording’s expressive 
interests under an intermediate scrutiny time, place, manner test”); Seth F. 
Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, 
and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 395–96 (2011) (suggesting that 
balancing privacy against recording might be appropriate under Supreme Court 
jurisprudence); Marc J. Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being Mapped): 
Reconceiving First Amendment Protection for Information Gathering in the Age 
of Google Earth, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 197–98 (2013) (arguing that 
First Amendment right to record could be overcome by legitimate government 
interests in privacy). For a general debate on challenges of information privacy, 
see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN L. REV. 
1049 (2000).  
 7. Amelia J. Uelmen, Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification, 12 U. 
MASS. L. REV. 68, 75 (2017). Uelmen writes that taking pictures of people in their 
everyday activity “may also be problematic and morally wrong,” however she 
distinguishes those instances from her proposed tort which imagines the 
scenarios where the victim is vulnerable and in need of emergency assistance. Id. 
at 110. She opines, “Limiting the tort to encounters with a vulnerable person in 
need of emergency assistance helps to keep the harm complained of within 
judicially cognizable limits.” Id. at 116. 
 8. Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of 
Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140 (2006). 
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that “recognize and legally protect the need for dignity.”9 
Others have addressed the unwanted consequences of use of 
facial recognition technology.10 None have addressed the 
concern of widespread dissemination of images on social 
media platforms persuasively, or given attention to the role 
that tort law might play in defining new wrongs related to 
the dissemination of one’s image in cyberspace and 
“empowering private parties to initiate proceedings designed 
to hold tortfeasors accountable.”11 
In the age of social media, the unwanted dissemination 
of the videos and images of an individual causes a distinct 
injury. Publications on social media are “instantaneous, 
readily accessible by both recipient and onlookers, . . . 
cumulative, persistent, viral, potentially global in reach, 
continuous, and unless arrested, permanent.”12 Unlike 
human memory, the internet does not forget—one’s image is 
retrievable years after an incident. Yet the currently 
recognized privacy torts do not help in addressing this new 
injury. The most relevant tort—appropriation of likeness—
renders persons liable for appropriating another’s image, but 
in several states13 only when they do so for commercial gain. 
14 Furthermore, as in the Clearview AI facial recognition app 
 
 9. ANNE S.Y. CHEUNG, UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG FACULTY OF LAW, 
REVISITING PRIVACY AND DIGNITY: ONLINE SHAMING IN THE GLOBAL E-VILLAGE 11 
(2014) (noting that “such dignity should prevail over the right of freedom of 
expression in the case of online shaming”). 
 10. Welinder, supra note 5, at 168 (calling for a regulation on facial 
recognition technologies). 
 11. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEXAS 
L. REV. 917, 946–47 (2010) (introducing the civil recourse theory in torts and 
stating “tort law provides victims with an avenue of civil recourse against those 
who have committed relational and injurious wrongs against them”). 
 12. SIR MICHAEL TUGENDHAT & IAIN CHRISTIE, THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE 
MEDIA 760 (N. A. Moreham & Sir Mark Warby eds., 3d ed. 2016). 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See infra Part I. For a study of the challenges and limitations of the 
existing tort privacy see Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 
9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. REV. 357 (2011); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. 
Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010). 
146 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
case, there are ways that the use of one’s publicly available 
image does not fall into the premises of the appropriation of 
likeness tort standard. The action for violations of the right 
of publicity, too, is limited. It only protects celebrities and 
owners of celebrities’ images, not so much the ordinary 
persons.15 
The federal Communication Decency Act (“CDA”) only 
intensifies the need for recognizing a common law cause of 
action.16 Section 230(c) limits the liability of internet service 
providers,17 including the liability of websites that post 
others’ content.18 Section 230 was “written long before 
Facebook or Twitter existed.”19 With its shortcomings and 
the apparent unwillingness of the Congress to address the 
criticisms over the statute,20 this Article looks to the common 
law of torts to find a path forward. 
Building on the mainstream privacy torts, the tort this 
Article proposes allows courts to further promote privacy in 
public spaces, foster responsible behavior among social 
media users, and compensate the injured. For this proposed 
tort, the injury is the retrievable visibility caused by the 
unwanted broadcast of one’s image which renders the 
 
 15. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
 16. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012) (stating “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be held liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily 
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to 
material described in paragraph (1)”). 
 17. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding 
American Online immune from liability for delayed removing of defamatory 
content posted by third party). 
 18. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
 19. Sarah Jeong, Politicians Want to Change the Internet’s Most Important 
Law. They Should Read It First, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/opinion/section-230-political-neutrality.html. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
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individual powerless over one’s presence in public, taking 
away one’s power over self-presentation for an undetermined 
period of time.  
Of course, any privacy tort must conform to First 
Amendment limitations and, in particular, modern courts’ 
expansive conception of what counts as newsworthy and 
therefore protected speech. However, the terms on which 
liability will be imposed under the tort advocated here 
comport with constitutional principles. By recognizing the 
exception of newsworthy content explained in Part III, the 
tort of unwanted broadcast will work side by side with the 
other privacy torts such as appropriation of likeness. 
To justify the proposed tort in this Article, Part I 
provides a look into the social media industry and the issue 
with the widespread publications. It then discusses the legal 
options an individual may decide to pursue based on the 
current available legal remedies in tort and copyright law. 
Part I illuminates the shortcomings of each path in 
addressing the privacy breach of unwanted broadcasted 
images on social media platforms. 
Part II examines the new privacy tort recognized by U.K. 
law, and the European Union’s approach to the unwanted 
publication of images and the recognition of the right to be 
forgotten. Each approach supports the idea of a greater 
protection for privacy. The right to be forgotten in Europe, 
while including all data—visual and nonvisual—not only 
demonstrates the missing part that exists in the U.S. legal 
discourse, but also the possibility for bold moves that provide 
a greater protection of individuals’ rights of privacy. Part II 
then turns to a theoretical examination of the nature of 
privacy and whether the proposed tort is supported by any of 
several widely recognized privacy theories. It examines 
ongoing debates on what privacy is and relates the 
theoretical framework to the proposed tort of unwanted 
broadcasting. 
Part III proposes the new tort of unwanted broadcasting, 
focusing on traditional notions of physical presence and 
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boundaries in public spaces. Part III also addresses and 
rebuts First Amendment objections to the recognition of this 
tort and elaborates on the exception to the proposed tort. 
PART I 
A. Social Media and Life in Public 
The rise of social media platforms such as Instagram, 
Twitter, and Facebook have created an unprecedented 
degree of image sharing. From drinking a cup of coffee to 
diving deep in the ocean, it is common now for people to 
constantly record everyday activities. This billion-dollar 
industry21 has created a platform for many voices.22 From 
cooks blogging about food to social activists fighting for a 
cause, social media facilitate publications that reach 
unprecedented audiences. In the new social network era, 
Instagramers, influencers, and social media sensations 
generate income from the content of their pages.23 They are 
also “chasing users” unstoppably.24 Some go as far as 
purchasing followers to showcase, falsely, their popularity.25  
 
 21. Emily McCormick, Instagram Is Estimated to Be Worth More than $100 
Billion, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 25, 2018, 1:26 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2018-06-25/value-of-facebook-s-instagram-estimated-to-top-100-
billion (last updated June 25, 2018, 2:17 PM). 
 22. For a discussion on the overwhelming false speech on social media 
platforms see Louis W. Tompros, Richard A. Crudo, Alexis Pfeiffer & Rahel 
Boghossian, The Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social 
Networking Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 HARV. J. OF 
L. & TECH. 65 (2017). 
 23. See, e.g., Jules Schroeder, 5 Millennial Instagramers Share How They Get 
Paid To Travel The World, FORBES (June 29, 2017, 4:09 PM), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/julesschroeder/2017/06/29/5-millennial-instagramers-
share-how-they-get-paid-to-travel-the-world/#59a5226647fd. 
 24. Dante Disparte, Facebook And The Tyranny Of Monthly Active Users, 
FORBES (July 28, 2018, 5:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dantedisparte/ 
2018/07/28/facebook-and-the-tyranny-of-monthly-active-users/#251d6c796aea.  
 25. See, e.g., Natalie Robehmed, For Sale: Instagram Followers and Likes, 
FORBES (July 19, 2012, 10:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalie 
robehmed/2012/07/19/for-sale-instagram-follows-and-likes/#5564427617ce; 
Madeline Buxton, It’s Insanely Easy To Buy Thousands Of Instagram Followers 
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To generate revenue or attract audiences, Instagram 
users may and do use pictures and stories of other 
individuals to either mock, shame, tease or to just have fun 
at the expense of others’ privacy. As Tim Wu notes, “The 
forces of wealth creation no longer favor the expansion of 
privacy but work to undermine it.”26  
What is missing in debates surrounding social media is 
the power of a retrievable posted image. An enduring 
photograph can reveal much more than a real-time live 
observation. It “may capture more information than even a 
careful observer would perceive, will preserve that 
information in a potentially permanent form, and can be 
used to communicate more information more efficiently than 
mere words easily could.”27 In any given day, whether we like 
it or not, we are in people’s cellphone video clips, souvenir 
pictures, and more. It is the reality of our times. The law does 
not provide one with a legal basis to oppose being 
photographed randomly on the streets. Yet, being 
photographed in public spaces is not the same as having 
one’s image circulated widely on the Internet for millions of 
people to see for an indefinite period of time. The fact is that 
“[w]e act differently when we know we are ‘on the record.’ 
Mass privacy is the freedom to act without being watched 
and thus, in a sense, to be who we really are—not who we 
want others to think we are.”28 
 
—But Should You?, REFINERY29 (Apr. 10, 2017, 11:20 AM), https:// 
www.refinery29.com/how-to-buy-instagram-followers (last updated Oct. 18, 
2018, 4:50 PM). Twitter reportedly took down around 70 million fake accounts in 
May and June 2018. See Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter is sweeping 




 26. Tim Wu, How Capitalism Betrayed Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/opinion/sunday/privacy-capitalism.html. 
 27. NICHOLAS J. MCBRIDE & RODERICK BAGSHAW, TORT LAW 600 (4th ed. 2012). 
 28. Wu, supra note 26.  
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In limited cases on the social media platforms, such as 
when an individual’s picture is used to impersonate her 
identity by a third party, one has certain forms of recourse. 
She can, for example, ask a social media platform to address 
the issue, and they might well do so.29 However, besides a 
limited number of exceptions, the individual whose image is 
being circulated without her consent and against her will 
cannot choose to stop the dissemination of her image once it 
has begun. The harm of this form of instant and global 
dissemination of images is of a different order, and the 
benefits of publicizing such images in enduring retrievable 
form are not palpable. The individual is forced into an 
unwanted self-presentation that violates the individual’s 
privacy.30 This is especially alarming considering the new 
trends of deep fake technology,31 and facial recognition 
apps32 that perpetuate unimaginable privacy harms.  
Currently, the law affords individuals several tools to 
address the unwanted dissemination. However, as this 
Article illustrates, none are adequate to address the harm of 
unwanted instant and global dissemination of imagery of 
persons in public spaces via social media platforms with its 
enduring retrievability. 
 
 29. Instagram’s help page, for example, gives guidelines on how to file a report 
if you believe an account is impersonating you. However, you do need a 
government issued I.D. If after filing your claim, the third party does not take 
down your image, you are then asked to submit a photo of yourself, holding your 
government issued I.D. in your hand, to further continue with your complaint. 
This is a burden for countries where Instagram does not have an active presence 
and the users may or may not be able to follow up with the rules. See 
Impersonation Accounts, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/44666317538 
2270 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 30. See infra Part II. 
 31. For more on deep fake, see, e.g., Chesney, Robert and Citron, Danielle 
Keats, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National 
Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. (Forthcoming 2019). 
 32. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We 
Know It (Jan 18, 2020). https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/ 
clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
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B. Existing Recourses and Limitations 
Analysis of liability for invasions of privacy under U.S. 
law begin with Dean Prosser’s influential framework,33 
which isolated four distinct privacy torts34 based on Samuel 
Warren & Louis Brandeis’s call for a common-law right to 
privacy.35 Later, Prosser argued the torts recognized by 
courts following the Privacy article were not just one tort, but 
“four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of 
the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, 
but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that 
each represent an interference with the right of the plaintiff 
. . . ‘to be let alone.’”36 He described the four privacy torts as 
follows: “1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or 
solitude, or into his private affairs. 2. Public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 3. Publicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4. 
Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness.”37 The unwanted broadcast of 
one’s image on social media falls between the cracks of these 
categories. 
1. Appropriation of Likeness and the Right to Publicity 
For the tort of appropriation, Prosser initially suggested 
the courts should first ask “whether there has been 
appropriation of an aspect of the plaintiff’s identity,”38 and 
next “whether the defendant has appropriated the name or 
 
 33. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 34. Id. Goldberg and Zipursky point to Prosser’s role as the lead reporter for 
the American Law Institute’s Second Restatement of Torts in this widespread 
adaptation as he “incorporated his article’s framework into the new 
Restatement.” JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD 
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 331 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010). 
 35. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
 36. Prosser, supra note 33, at 389. 
 37. Id. at 389. 
 38. Id. at 403. 
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likeness for his own advantage.”39 Today, the defendant in 
the tort of appropriation of likeness must show the voice, 
likeness or name has been used without permission “for 
commercial purposes.”40 Commercial speech enjoys a lower 
level of First Amendment protection, and recognizing what 
constitutes commercial speech for the purposes of this tort 
may not be easy.41 
The facts of early leading lawsuits are illuminating. In 
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., plaintiff appealed 
from a lower court decision that had rejected her claim.42 
Defendant, a flour company, had used Ms. Roberson’s 
portrait to advertise their product without her consent. They 
had spread about 25,000 lithographic prints and 
photographs of the plaintiff in stores, warehouses, saloons, 
and other public places.43 While, in 1902, no distinct action 
for the invasion of privacy was recognized, plaintiff asked the 
court to “enjoin a further circulation of the lithographic 
prints containing her portrait made as alleged in the 
complaint, and, as an incident thereto, to reimburse her for 
the damages to her feelings, which the complaint fixes at the 
sum of $15,000.”44 
The court was not willing to recognize the property nor 
the privacy rights of Ms. Roberson in her image, probably 
influenced in part by the then-prevailing strongly sexist 
prejudices.45 The court opined: 
 
 39. Id. at 405. 
 40. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 34, at 335. 
 41. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Mo. 2003) 
(discussing the different approaches jurisdictions have taken in identifying 
commercial speech). 
 42. 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902) (superseded by statute).  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 443. 
 45. See JESSICA LAKE, THE FACE THAT LAUNCHED A THOUSAND LAWSUITS, THE 
AMERICAN WOMEN WHO FORGED A RIGHT TO PRIVACY 67 (2016) (“[C]hief Justice 
Parker’s inability to identify with her meant he could not understand or 
empathize with her plight, which led to his unwillingness to provide her with a 
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The so-called “right of privacy” is, as the phrase suggests, founded 
upon the claim that a man has the right to pass through this world, 
if he wills, without having his picture published, his business 
enterprises discussed, his successful experiments written up for the 
benefit of others, or his eccentricities commented upon either in 
handbills, circulars, catalogues, periodicals, or newspapers; and, 
necessarily, that the things which may not be written and published 
of him must not be spoken of him by his neighbors, whether the 
comment be favorable or otherwise.46 
In rejecting Ms. Roberson’s claim, the New York Court of 
Appeals noted that “she has been caused to suffer mental 
distress where others would have appreciated the 
compliment to their beauty implied in the selection of the 
picture for such purposes.”47 Justice Parker pointed out, “The 
likeness is said to be a very good one, and one that her friends 
and acquaintances were able to recognize.” 48  
Consequently, the New York legislature enacted a 
statute that recognized a right of publicity in its civil code:49 
Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used within 
this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade 
without the written consent first obtained [as provided in Civil 
Rights Law § 50] may maintain an equitable action . . . to prevent 
and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages 
for any injuries sustained by reason of such use . . . .50 
Meanwhile, at about the same time, the Georgia 
Supreme Court in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. took 
a different path and recognized liability for misappropriation 
of likeness.51 In Pavesich, plaintiff brought a suit against an 
insurance company that had used his picture in an 
advertisement. Mr. Pavesich was not a famous man, yet the 
 
remedy.”). 
 46. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 443. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 442.  
 49. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2019). 
 50. Id.; see also Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 97 N.E.3d 389, 
393 (N.Y. 2018) (citing Civil Rights Law § 51). 
 51. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
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court recognized that even if he was, it did not mean that his 
picture could be “displayed in places where he would never 
go to be gazed upon, at times when and under circumstances 
where if he were personally present the sensibilities of his 
nature would be severely shocked.”52 
Goldberg and Zipursky categorize the three protected 
interests of the tort of appropriation of likeness as follows: a 
privacy interest against unwanted exposure, an autonomy 
interest in controlling the presentation of one’s image to 
others, and an economic interest in the value of one’s 
image.53 
Yet, some aspects of the tort gradually became 
associated with celebrity rights and economic gains over the 
years of its development and moved further away from its 
initial natural law basis.54 In an article written by Harold R. 
Gordon in 1960, the author encouraged the recognition of a 
distinct right of appropriation—for commercial exploitation 
rather than injury to feelings55—that would help the 
confused courts address the lawsuits involving commercial 
exploitation of public figures.56 With Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broad. Co.57—the only case to date involving this 
tort that has gone to the U.S. Supreme Court—an 
independent right of publicity was boosted.58  
 
 52. Id. at 80. 
 53. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 34, at 336. 
 54. See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 71 (“The right of privacy within certain limits is 
a right derived from natural law, recognized by the principles of municipal law, 
and guaranteed to persons in this state both by the Constitutions of the United 
States and of the state of Georgia, in those provisions which declare that no 
person shall be deprived of liberty except by due process of law.”). 
 55. Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and 
History, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 553, 613, 555 (1960). 
 56. See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 73 (2018). 
 57. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
 58. 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). The Court rejected the First Amendment 
defense and allowed certain publicity cases to be heard despite the mandate of 
First Amendment on free speech and newsworthiness. Id. at 578. The plaintiff 
had filed the lawsuit when 15 seconds of his performance as a human cannonball 
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In Zacchini, the Court explained that “[t]he State’s 
interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the 
proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to 
encourage such entertainment”59 and that “[t]he State’s 
interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent and 
copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap 
the reward of his endeavors and having little to do with 
protecting feelings or reputation.”60 
Later, in Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.61 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit wrote: “The 
right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial 
interest of celebrities in their identities. The theory of the 
right is that a celebrity’s identity can be valuable in the 
promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that 
may be protected from the unauthorized commercial 
exploitation of that identity.”62 In such cases, “celebrities are 
not injured by the exposure in the media,”63 they only want 
to be compensated for it. Many lawsuits involving the right 
of publicity are now similar to lawsuits involving intellectual 
property rights.64 For example, in White v. Samsung Elecs. 
Am., Inc. the court ruled in favor of Vanna White, a T.V. 
personality who claimed Samsung had infringed her 
publicity by using a robot in an advertisement that looked 
like her.65 Right of publicity, as a result of this development 
 
was recorded and broadcasted on tv by a freelance reporter. Id. at 564. 
 59. Id. at 573.  
 60. Id. 
 61. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 62. Id. at 835. 
 63. MICHAEL D. MURRAY, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN A NUTSHELL 21 (2018).  
 64. WESTON ANSON, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: ANALYSIS, VALUATION AND THE LAW 5 
(2015). Anson states, “The right of publicity falls outside the parameters of the 
three main areas of intellectual property—copyrights, trademarks, and patents—
however most IP attorneys typically spend their time.” “However, the federal 
courts and the vast majority of state courts agree that the right of publicity is an 
IP right, and that it is an overlooked IP right in many cases.” Id. 
 65. 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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and its distinct features from the tort of appropriation of 
likeness, now survives the death of the celebrity whose image 
is being used, whereas the appropriation of likeness tort is 
personal and does not survive the death of the person whose 
image is being used.66As a result, right of publicity claims 
remain in the hands of the famous who want to recoup lost 
economic gains.  
As for the tort of appropriation of likeness, courts 
generate different outcomes depending on the local statute 
and the method of analyzing the harm. The Second 
Restatement of Torts, too, notes commercial gain is generally 
not a requirement of an appropriation of likeness claim.67 
Nevertheless, today, statutes in New York,68 Oklahoma,69 
Utah,70 and Virginia71 require the tort of appropriation of 
likeness to involve an economic gain for the defendant.72 In 
Binion v. O’Neal, for example, plaintiff was initially able to 
commence an invasion of privacy claim and avoid a motion 
to dismiss.73 The 23 year-old plaintiff who suffered from a 
medical condition had posted his own picture on his public 
Instagram account. Defendant, a famous former basketball 
player, posted one of those pictures with his own face next to 
it on his Instagram account with more than 8 million 
 
 66. For a discussion on the differences of appropriation of likeness and the 
right of publicity, see Kathryn Riley, Misappropriation of Name or Likeness 
versus Invasion of Right of Publicity, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 587, 590–91 
(2001). 
 67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 68. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2019). 
 69. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449 (West 2019). 
 70. See, e.g., Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 565 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim of appropriation of likeness, reasoning that it 
had no intrinsic value. Thus, the plaintiff could not maintain an action for 
appropriation of likeness under UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-3. Id. at 564. 
 71. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (2019). 
 72. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 73. No. 15-60869-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2016 WL 111344, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 11, 2016). 
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followers, mocking the young man. Plaintiff sued O’Neal for 
appropriation of likeness, among other privacy torts. 
Defendant argued the plaintiff appropriation claim fails 
“because Binion lacks a significant pecuniary or commercial 
interest in his identity.”74 Applying Michigan law, the court 
held in favor of the plaintiff since Michigan does not require 
defendants to make commercial use of an image for the tort 
of misappropriation.75 Although the case was later resolved 
through mediation,76 it was a victory for a non-celebrity to 
make a valid appropriation of likeness claim.  
Nevertheless, the various approaches different 
jurisdictions take in handling the appropriation of likeness 
lawsuits do not create a unified protection for individuals 
whose pictures and video recordings are easily shared on 
social media accounts without their consent. The privacy tort 
of appropriation of likeness was initially a response to 
unwanted exposure. In the face of the social media age and 
the emerging ways the tech industry enables the use of 
images in producing new products, such as that of the 
Clearview AI facial recognition app, there are harms that do 
fall under the tort of appropriation of likeness umbrella. The 
exposure and spread of images on social media platforms are 
unlike anything imaginable even twenty years ago. Many 
claims do not involve celebrities and are not for economic 
gain, making it very difficult to access the appropriation 
right as a remedy. This limited scope may force plaintiffs to 
seek refuge in the tort of false light. Below I will discuss why 
false light also proves to be inadequate. 
  
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (citing Asmi v. Nasir, No. 316208, 2014 WL 5690503, at *10 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Nov. 4, 2014)). 
 76. Binion v. O’Neal, No. 15-60869-CIV, 2016 WL 614523, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 
16, 2016), vacated, No. 15-60869-CIV, 2016 WL 3511940 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2016) 
(showing that mediation was ordered before the case was dismissed). 
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2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
The tort of public disclosure of private facts is concerned 
with the publicity of an aspect of one’s life. The Second 
Restatement of Torts distinguishes between “publication” 
and “publicity” to highlight the core of privacy torts. Unlike 
the publication element of defamation, publicity means: 
[t]hat the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public 
at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as 
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. The 
difference is not one of the means of communication, which may be 
oral, written or by any other means. It is one of a communication 
that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.77 
It is the element of publicity that gives rise to an 
obligation to refrain from publicizing certain information 
about an aspect of another person’s life that you are aware 
of.78 In public disclosure of private facts, the tortfeasor has 
obtained certain information about an individual without 
necessarily intruding upon that individual’s privacy. 
Nevertheless, she may be held liable if she gives publicity to 
the private facts of that person’s life. This distinction is 
crucial because tort law is recognizing, once again, that there 
are aspects of our life that we do not want to be publicized, 
even though certain people may already know them. 
However, the subject matter of the facts disclosed should 
pertain to an aspect of our “private life,” as opposed to our 
public life, one which if publicized “would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person, and is not of legitimate concern to the 
public.”79 By these requirements, the tort carves out the 
public life of the individual. Therefore, based on this tort, 
there is no liability for giving further publicity to what the 
plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye. Thus, “[H]e 
normally cannot complain when his photograph is taken 
 
 77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 78. This is different from the tort of “intrusion upon seclusions” in which a 
person (or an entity such as the government) intrudes upon one’s private space. 
 79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D. 
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while he is walking down the public street and is published 
in the defendant’s newspaper.”80 The Restatement’s 
description leaves no room for the new harm identified in this 
Article to be redressed by this tort. Notwithstanding, there 
is still room for liability for what is not newsworthy. The 
publication addressed in this Article is in a new space—social 
media—with a global audience, one that makes the medium’s 
peculiar qualities the reason why a specific tort needs to be 
recognized to address the harm.  
3. False Light 
Another one of Prosser’s privacy torts is “[p]ublicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.”81 
This tort involves “a false statement about the plaintiff that 
affects the way third parties view her, and thereby harms the 
plaintiff.”82 The Second Restatement of Torts defines the tort 
of false light as: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places 
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to 
the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to 
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the 
other would be placed.83 
An example of the tort of false light is illustrated in 
Duncan v. Peterson.84 In this case, a pastor filed a lawsuit 
against his former church. The church had sent letters to Mr. 
Duncan’s new church accusing him of unbiblical behavior. 
The letters claimed he should no longer be able to keep the 
 
 80. Id. special note. 
 81. Prosser, supra note 33, at 389.  
 82. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 34, at 334. 
 83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. 
 84. 835 N.E.2d 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
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title “Pastor.”85 Mr. Duncan argued the letters were false and 
violated his privacy. The Appellate Court of Illinois sided 
with Mr. Duncan and noted that although the complaint did 
not mention false light, “the alleged wrongdoing describes a 
cause of action for the tort of placing a person in a false 
light,”86 requiring similar elements to those specified in the 
Second Restatement of Torts. 
False light is not a thriving tort,87 and its four corners 
remain vague.88 Nevertheless, the underlying basis for 
recognizing this tort is the distinct harm of the spread of non-
defamatory but false information, one which is undesirable, 
“albeit in a manner that is often hard to pin down.”89 The tort 
does not help in addressing the widespread broadcast of one’s 
image on online social media platforms, yet it emphasizes the 
range of privacy concerns the law is capable of protecting. 
4. Copyright Protection 
Can an individual find recourse through copyright laws 
when her image is posted on social media platforms and 
widely viewed without her consent? While it may be true that 
 
 85. Id. at 415. 
 86. Id. at 422. 
 87. See, e.g., Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2008) 
(declining to recognize the tort of false light); Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 
893, 894 (Colo. 2002) (rejecting the tort of false light as “duplicative of defamation 
both in interests protected and conduct averted”); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 
S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1994) (ruling false light substantially duplicates the tort of 
defamation and therefore rejecting the tort of false light). 
 88. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court extended the New York Times 
v. Sullivan rule to private figures, ruling that they also need to prove actual 
malice for a false light action. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 390. However, in Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, the Court stepped back on the requirement of actual malice for 
private figures in defamation lawsuits. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345–46. Whether Gertz 
also applies to false light claims, in light of Time, Inc. v. Hill decision, remains 
unsolved. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E took no position on this 
issue. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 89. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 34, at 334. 
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“copyright infringement is essentially a tort,”90 copyright is 
now an elaborate distinct body of law that has developed 
particularly in response to advancements in technology.91 
The Copyright Act of 1976 and its amendments continue to 
provide guidelines for courts on the new challenges of 
copyright law. 
On social media platforms, copyright issues are 
especially challenging “[b]ecause a growing number of social 
networking sites allow users to post photos, videos, and other 
digital files for public viewing, inevitably resulting in their 
copying and distribution.”92 The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA)93 tried to address some of these 
concerns.94 
In order to answer the initial question of whether one can 
claim a right to her distributed image under copyright law, 
it is necessary to define what counts as copyrightable 
material. Based on the 1976Copyright Act, “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with aid of a machine or device” are copyrightable material, 
which does not include “any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”95 
 
 90. Sverker K. Hogberg, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary 
Liability in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 914 n.33 (2006).  
 91. Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 585, 588 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417 (1984)). 
 92. Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Social Networking Web Sites 
and the DMCA: A Safe-Harbor from Copyright Infringement Liability or the 
Perfect Storm, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2007). 
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).  
 94. See Jessica Gutierrez Alm, “Sharing” Copyrights: The Copyright 
Implications of User Content in Social Media, 35 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 104, 
104 (2014). 
 95. 17 U.S.C. § 102.  
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Through Section 301(a), the Act’s definition of copyrightable 
materials preempts any state law to the contrary.96  
Copyright protection is distinct from the right of 
publicity.97 An individual’s persona, his or her name, 
likeness, and attributes, is not a copyrightable work.98 
Nevertheless, the two may at times conflict. When, for 
example, the persona is depicted “in a medium associated 
with copyrighted works.”99 In these cases, distinguishing 
between the right of publicity and the copyrighted material 
may be challenging.100 
In Garcia v. Google, Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected a 
notion of publicity protection deriving from copyright 
regulations.101 The court stated, “In broad terms, ‘the 
protection of privacy is not a function of the copyright 
law. . . . To the contrary, the copyright law offers a limited 
 
 96. On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as 
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as 
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and 
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. 
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such 
work under the common law or statutes of any State. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
 
 97. For a discussion on how copyright laws do not run afoul of the First 
Amendment, see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS 
TO KNOW 45 (2018). 
 98. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 47 
(3d ed. 2010). 
 99. Id. at 731.  
 100. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames 201 F.3d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 2000) (deciding that 
the publicity claim was not preempted by the Copyright Act); cf. Baltimore 
Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987) (ruling on preemption of the baseball 
players’ rights of publicity). For a discussion on these two cases see COHEN ET AL., 
supra note 98, at 731. 
 101. 786 F.3d 733, 736–37 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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monopoly to encourage ultimate public access to the creative 
work of the author.’”102 
Therefore, the copyright law too fails to protect against 
the harm of dissemination of an individual’s image in the 
manner identified in this Article. An individual does not have 
a copyrightable claim towards her image taken in public. 
Quite the opposite, the person who captures another’s image 
may stand to gain a copyright to her creation.  
Existing laws in the U.S. provide little or no basis for 
liability for the dissemination of images of persons captured 
in public spaces. In the next Part, I will explain how the 
common law system of the United Kingdom handles similar 
privacy violations to the one explained in this Article. I will 
then examine the prominent privacy theories and offer a new 
account pertaining to social media platform privacy. 
PART II 
A. Comparative Study of the United Kingdom Privacy Law 
Among the commonwealth jurisdictions, the U.K. has 
had the most dynamic evolution in its protection-of-privacy 
doctrine.103 This is so even though the U.K. does not 
recognize an “over-arching, all -embracing cause of action for 
‘invasion of privacy.’”104 Historically, it protected privacy 
through reliance on the equity doctrine of breach of 
confidence. However, the House of Lords abandoned this 
approach in Campbell v MGN, 105 in which it first recognized 
the “tort of wrongful disclosure of private information,” also 
referred to as “misuse of private information.”106 Now breach 
 
 102. Id. at 745 (citing Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir.2003)). 
 103. Samuel Beswick & William Fotherby, The Divergent Paths of 
Commonwealth Privacy Torts, 84 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 226 (2018). 
 104. Campbell v. MGN [2004] UKHL 22 [11], [2004] 2 AC 457 (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
 105. Id.  
 106. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 591. 
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of privacy is seen as “the violation of a citizen’s autonomy, 
dignity and self-esteem,” not as a breach of confidence.107 In 
addition, the House of Lords recognized the tort of wrongfully 
obtaining access to private information in 2010.108 
In Campbell v. MGN, a newspaper called The Mirror ran 
a story on the famous model Naomi Campbell.109 Under the 
title “Naomi: I am a drug addict,” the article included a 
picture of Ms. Campbell standing outside of a building after 
a support group meeting.110 Ms. Campbell sued the paper for 
damages for breach of confidence and demanded 
compensation under the Data Protection Act of 1998. In 
ruling in favor of Ms. Campbell, the House of Lords 
recognized the tort of wrongful disclosure of private 
information and later developed it in Mosley v. News Group 
Newspapers Ltd.111 
Two different views emerged in Campbell on the nature 
of the harm suffered by a victim of breach of privacy. The 
minority view, stated by Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffmann, 
emphasized the importance of privacy as a way to preserve 
and protect an individual’s dignity, personality, and well-
being.112 The majority, however, “placed greater emphasis on 
the emotional and psychological impact that the publications 
had on the claimant.”113 
The Court discussed the theoretical basis for the 
protection of wrongful use of private information on grounds 
of breach of confidence. However, the Court insisted that this 
nomenclature was misleading.114 Lord Birkenhead wrote 
 
 107. Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777 [7] (Eng.). 
 108. Imerman v. Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA (Civ) 908 (Eng.). 
 109. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22. 
 110. Id. at [2]. 
 111. See Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) at [232]. 
 112. N. A. Moreham, Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctorial and Theoretical 
Analysis, 121 L. Q. REV. 628, 634 (2005). 
 113. Id. at 635. 
 114. Cambell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22 [13], [2004] 2 AC 457 (appeal taken 
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that the values underlying the European Convention on 
Human Rights have larger applicability and are not confined 
to disputes between individuals and public authorities.115 
For the court, “the touchstone of private life is whether in 
respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy,”116 and not whether the 
information was within the sphere of the complainant’s 
private or family life.117 
Lord Hoffmann noted that the new tort “focuses upon the 
protection of human autonomy and dignity—the right to 
control the dissemination of information about one’s private 
life and the right to esteem and respect of other people.”118 In 
this regard, the information need not be secret: “what 
matters is whether they can reasonably expect to retain some 
control over its dissemination.”119 Lord Hoffmann further 
wrote, “The widespread publication of a photograph of 
someone which reveals him to be in a situation of humiliation 
or severe embarrassment, even if taken in a public place, 
may be an infringement of the privacy of his personal 
information.”120 
N.A. Moreham, a New Zealand privacy scholar, correctly 
concludes from the this case, “privacy is about the protection 
of autonomy and dignity and an intrusion upon those 
interests will not automatically be less significant because 
the claimant cannot point to any physical or financial 
detriment which he or she suffered as a result of it.” 121 
 
from Eng.). 
 115. Id. at [18]. 
 116. Id. at [21]. 
 117. Id. at [20]. 
 118. Id. at [51]. 
 119. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 595.  
 120. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22 at [75]. 
 121. Moreham, supra note 112, at 635–36. 
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Later in Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd.,122 the 
court differentiated between the publication of a story in a 
newspaper and the publication of a story accompanied by a 
video clip on the newspaper’s website.123 The defendant had 
used a hidden camera to record sexual activities involving 
Max Mosely, the president of Fédération Internationale de 
l’Automobile. The Court cited the opinion in D v. L which 
said:  
A court may restrain the publication of an improperly obtained 
photograph even if the taker is free to describe the information 
which the photographer provides or even if the information revealed 
by the photograph is in the public domain. It is no answer to the 
claim to restrain the publication of an improperly obtained 
photograph that the information portrayed by the photograph is 
already available in the public domain.124 
The Court ruled for the plaintiff and noted “it should not 
be assumed that, even if the subject-matter of the meeting 
on 28 March was of public interest, the showing of the film 
or the pictures was a reasonable method of conveying that 
information.”125 The English court rejected a mere broad 
generalization that public figures must expect less privacy. 
Instead, the court focused on a proportionality approach 
which would determine privacy violations with a focus on the 
individual circumstances of each lawsuit.126 
The English tort of wrongful disclosure has a larger 
inclusive scope than its name may imply to an American 
audience. It has been used by ordinary—not celebrity—
plaintiffs “who have attracted the attention of the media, 
such as victims of crime, people who suffer from unusual 
illnesses, and the children of famous parents.”127 The robust 
 
 122. Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777 (Eng.). 
 123. Id. at [22]–[24].  
 124. Id. at [18] (quoting D v. L [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1169 [23] (Eng.)). 
 125. Id. at [21]. 
 126. Id. at [12]. 
 127. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 590. 
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approach the English courts have taken in applying this tort 
has helped remedy a wide range of privacy violations. Part of 
this is attributable to Article 8128 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).129 The Convention 
requires a higher degree of privacy protection compared to 
the original protection offered by the English courts. For 
example, the European Court of Human Rights held that 
Princess Caroline of Monaco had a right not to be 
photographed as she went about her everyday life despite the 
fact that she is well known and was appearing in public.130 
The success of a lawsuit by a celebrity in a similar situation 
in a U.S. jurisdiction is almost unimaginable.131 
Notwithstanding, recall that for the Pavesich court, 
dignity was also a driving factor.132 In Pavesich, as I 
discussed, the Georgia Supreme Court wrote that the right 
to privacy in “matters purely private” is derived from natural 
 
 128. European Court of Human Rights Article 8 describes the right to respect 
for private and family life:  
1.Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. 194, 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 129. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 592. 
 130. Id. at 609 (citing Von Hannover v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 24, 2004), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61853). 
 131. In a rare case, however, famous wrestler Hulk Hogan sued for damages 
after a sex tape of him surfaced on Gawker, an internet media website. Gawker 
attorneys claimed the publication of the sex tape was subject to the First 
Amendment and newsworthy. The jury ruled in favor of Hogan. The fact that the 
underlying privacy was a sexual act seems to have persuaded the court and the 
jury. See Ryan McCarthy, When a Sex Tape Is Newsworthy: Privacy in the 
Internet Era, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2016/03/04/us/Hulk-Hogan-sex-tape.html. 
 132. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905). 
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law.133 The court explained, “The right of privacy has its 
foundation in the instincts of nature. It is recognized 
intuitively, consciousness being the witness that can be 
called to establish its existence.”134 
Moreover, the emphasis on “balancing” of the facts of 
each case to decide whether the plaintiff is afforded a privacy 
protection has allowed for an inclusive privacy tort in the 
U.K.135 Based on this approach, a reasonable expectation of 
privacy may extend even to circumstances in which an 
individual is in public.136 The sharp public-versus-private 
binary categorization of U.S. privacy jurisprudence 
drastically limits the scope of invasion of privacy claim, 
making it difficult for individuals to claim “privacy” in 
“public.” By contrast, a softer approach to this binary can 
realistically address the emerging privacy concerns. 
Furthermore, persons subject to English law can benefit 
from the recourse provided through claims for harassment 
available under the Protection from Harassment Act of 
1997.137 The Act defines harassment as causing a person 
alarm or distress which occurs on at least two occasions,138 
and allows for the imposition of liability on harassment 
through speech.139 As such, it is a “flexible and effective 
weapon in putting a stop to the activities of a persistent 
online wrongdoer . . . .”140  
Lastly, the English Defamation Act of 1996 in the U.K. 
does not extend a protection to Internet Service Providers 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 69. 
 135. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 593.  
 136. Id. at 601 (discussing Murray v. Express Newspapers plc [2007] EWHC 
1908 (Ch), in which the court afforded privacy rights to J.K. Rowling’s 19-month-
old son who was photographed in public). 
 137. Protection from Harassment Act 1977, c. 40 (Eng. & Wales). 
 138. Id. §§ 1, 2, 7. 
 139. Id.; see also TUGENDHAT & CHRISTIE, supra note 11, at 763.  
 140. TUGENDHAT & CHRISTIE, supra note 12, at 763.  
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(“ISPs”) as broad as the protection provided by CDA Section 
230(c). In particular, an ISP on notice that it is transmitting 
defamatory content is a publisher of that content. In Godfrey 
v. Demon Internet Ltd., an English court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiff, a British lecturer in physics who complained 
against a bulletin board in which defamatory content about 
him was posted.141 The board failed to take down the content 
and was thus liable. 
The U.K. later passed the Defamation Act 2013 to amend 
the common law of defamation.142 Section 5 addresses the 
liability of operators of websites and holds that the operator 
is not liable if it shows it was not the one who posted the 
statement on the website. In this situation, the defense is 
defeated if the plaintiff shows that:  
(a) it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who 
posted the statement, 
(b) the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation 
to the statement, and 
(c) the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint in 
accordance with any provision contained in regulations.143 
Relying on the core principles of protecting the dignity 
and self-control over information has also pushed the E.U. to 
recognize a right to erasure, a.k.a. right to be forgotten. The 
E.U. right to be forgotten not only protects images and video 
recordings, but also personal information and data. After 
Brexit, it is possible—not yet certain—that the U.K. citizen 
will lose this right,144 and their alternative remains largely 
through recourse available under English tort law. Below I 
will briefly note how the protection functions. 
 
 141. Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd. [1999] EWHC (QB) 244 [3], [12]–[15], 
[33]–[35], [2001] QB 201 (Eng.). 
 142. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (Eng. & Wales). 
 143. Id. § 5. 
 144. Michael J. Kelly & David Satola, The Right to Be Forgotten, 2017 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2017). 
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B. The European Union Right to Erasure 
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms sets out the 
right to “private life.” E.U. residents also enjoy “Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data.”145 
In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
decided Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD).146 In this lawsuit, Mr. Gonzalez requested 
that Google take down from the search engine a real estate 
auction ad that listed one of his properties as having been 
sold to pay his debts. The ad appeared in a daily newspaper 
called La Vanguardia.147 Mr. Gonzalez complained the 
online dissemination of the data violated his “right to be 
forgotten.”148 
The Court held Google’s activities include “processing” 
within the meaning of Directive 95/46.149 It did not matter 
 
 145. Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 146. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317. 
 147. Id. paras. 14–15. 
 148. Id. para. 91. 
 149. Personal Data and processing of personal data was defined according to 
Article 2 of Directive 95/46 which stated:  
(a) “personal data” shall mean any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable person is 
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific 
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity; (b) “processing of personal data” (“processing”) shall mean any 
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, 
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction. 
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that the information found by search engine “[had] already 
been published on the internet and are not altered by the 
search engine.”150 It further ruled that the search engine is 
also the “controller” with respect to the processing of 
personal data in that context.151 
The Court reasoned that search results on Google are 
data related to Mr. Gonzalez,152 who is entitled to “protection 
of his rights and freedoms in regard to the processing of 
personal data and that it has investigative powers and 
effective powers of intervention enabling it to order in 
particular the blocking, erasure or destruction of data or to 
impose a temporary or definitive ban on such processing.”153 
According to the Court, economic interest cannot justify the 
search engine’s processing of such data.154 
The Court stated that Mr. Gonzalez’s objection to the 
processing of such data by the search engine, according to 
Article 12(b)155 of Directive 95/46, was on point since the 
objectionable data included not only inaccurate data but also 
“inadequate, irrelevant or excessive in relation to the 
purposes of the processing, that they are not kept up to date, 
or that they are kept for longer than is necessary unless they 
are required to be kept for historical statistical or scientific 
 
Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 150. Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317 para. 29. 
 151. Id. para. 32.  
 152. Id. para. 80. 
 153. Id. para. 78. 
 154. Id. para. 81.  
 155. “Article 12 Right of access: Member States shall guarantee every data 
subject the right to obtain from the controller: . . . (b) as appropriate the 
rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply 
with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or 
inaccurate nature of the data.” Council Directive 95/46, art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 
31 (EC). 
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purposes.”156 Therefore, “The information and links 
concerned in the list of results must be erased.”157  
The final balancing of the right of the public to have 
access to the information in dispute is for the court to 
decide.158 The Court continued: 
[T]hose rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of 
the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general 
public in finding that information upon a search relating to the data 
subject’s name. However, that would not be the case if it appeared, 
for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject 
in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is 
justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in 
having, on account of inclusion in the list of results, access to the 
information in question.159 
This decision introduced a new concept to the legal 
debate surrounding the right to privacy. It was also 
expanded in later decisions in Europe. The Spanish Supreme 
Court ruled “that the right to be forgotten imposes 
obligations not just on search engines but on newspapers and 
publishers of the underlying content as well.”160 The court 
placed the burden of technical developments to tackle this 
issue on the newspapers.161 The German, 162 Belgian,163 and 
 
 156. Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317 para. 92. 
 157. Id. para. 95.  
 158. Id. para. 98. 
 159. Id. para. 97. 
 160. Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Fourth Year of Forgetting: The Troubling 
Expansion of the Right to Be Forgotten, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1011, 1012 (2018) 
(citing S.T.S., Oct. 15, 2015 (J.T.S. No. 545) (Spain)) (criticizing the expansion of 
the right to be forgotten). 
 161. Id. at 1021.  
 162. Id. at 1025. (citing Hanseatic Oberlandesgericht, Hamburg, 7 Zivilsenat 
[OLG, Hamburg] [Higher Regional Court, Hamburg, 7th Civil Division] Jul. 7, 
2015, 7 U 29/12 (Ger.). 
 163. Id. at 1027 (citing Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], 29 April 
2016, AR C150052F, http://www.cass.be (Belg.) (holding that a newspaper should 
take down an archive of a newspaper article which wrote about the data subject’s 
criminal drunk driving to make sure it will not appear on Google’s search engine 
results)). 
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Italian164 courts have required similar obligation for 
newspapers as well. 
The many instances of the implementation of the right 
to be forgotten illustrates the influence of Google Spain 
throughout Europe. While the European Court of Justice did 
not rule on the geographical application of the right to be 
forgotten, privacy regulators argue the right expands far 
beyond Google’s European domains.165 
The Google Spain decision is binding for “EU-based web 
browsers, which means that private data can still be accessed 
via US or non-EU search engines.”166 The right to be 
forgotten, or de-linking unwanted personal information, in 
the EU is also subject to a balancing test considering “the 
nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for 
the data subject’s private life [on one hand] and the interest 
of the public in having that information [on the other 
hand.]”167 Furthermore, while the removed data are no 
longer accessible to the general public, the underlying data 
remains in the search engine’s database. However, with this 
approach, the EU court has created “a speed bump”168 for the 
fast-growing industry. 
The implication of such decision is a heavy burden on the 
internet-based companies. It has been reported that since 
2014, Google has received 650,000 requests for such 
erasures.169 This right was later introduced in the General 
 
 164. Id. at 1029 (citing Cass., sez. un., 24 giugno 2016, n. 13161, Giur. It. 2016, 
II, 1 (It.) (holding that the newspaper must pay damages to the data subject for 
leaving the news article online for a long time). 
 165. Id. at 1031–32 (disagreeing with a broad reading of the case that would 
apply the delisting right for Google’s users globally). 
 166. URSULA SMARTT, MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT LAW 97 (3rd ed. 2017). 
 167. Id. at 96. 
 168. Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 22, 2014) 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion (quoting 
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger). 
 169. James Doubek, Google Has Received 650,000 ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ 
Requests Since 2014, NPR (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:44 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
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Data Protection Regulation170 as “Right to Erasure.”171 
Outlining six grounds, GDPR establishes the right for the 
data subject to demand the controller erase “personal data 
concerning him or her without undue delay.”172 
This discussion illustrates the feasibility of such 
wholehearted approaches in balancing possible privacy 
violations in cyberspace. Although the court in 2019 
restricted the right to be forgotten to the EU member states’ 
jurisdiction,173 the right had an impact outside of the EU. An 
example of the right’s influence in the U.S. emerged in June 




 170. Commission Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and 
Repealing the Directive 95146/EC (General Data Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 
119/1). 
 171. The grounds under which the right is applicable are:  
the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for 
which they were collected or otherwise processed; 
the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based 
according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where 
there is no other legal ground for the processing; 
the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and 
there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data 
subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); 
the personal data have been unlawfully processed;  
the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal 
obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is 
subject; 
the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of 
information society services referred to in Article 8(1). 
Id. § 3, art. 17. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Case C-507/17, Google v. CNIL, ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-507/17# (“[C]urrently, 
there is no obligation under EU law, for a search engine operator who grants a 
request for de-referencing made by a data subject, as the case may be, following 
an injunction from a supervisory or judicial authority of a Member State, to carry 
out such a de-referencing on all the versions of its search engine.”). 
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enacted an amendment to Part 4 of Division 3 of California’s 
Civil Code, titled California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 
beginning in January 2020. Following the EU right-to-be-
forgotten model, California has recognized the right to 
request deletion of personal information from businesses. 
The new bill “would grant a consumer the right to request 
deletion of personal information and would require the 
business to delete upon receipt of a verified request, as 
specified.”174 According to section 1798.192 of California’s 
code the right is not waivable by agreement between the 
consumer and the business.175 
The right to erasure in the European Union and its 
possible influence in the U.S. is a double-edged example for 
the U.S. legal system. On the one hand, it illustrates the 
recognition of an individual’s interest in controlling access to 
one’s images on the web in a wide range of legal jurisdictions. 
On the other hand, the feasibility of a command to platforms 
to remove an image shows the simple way out of the 
dilemma. Notwithstanding, the current approach in the U.S. 
and the unwillingness of the legislature to put pressure on 
social media platforms forces us to look to the common law 
tools to offer a way to protect the individual’s privacy interest 
in her image. Building on these global approaches and legal 
frameworks, the next Section lays out a normative theory of 
privacy that mandates the protection of an individual’s 
privacy interest on social media platforms.  
C. A Privacy Theory Apt to Set Boundaries 
There are numerous accounts of defining privacy. It 
would be impossible to survey all of them, and this Section 
does not do so. Instead, it will lay out the most prominent 
and relevant privacy scholarship in the U.S.176 that can 
 
 174. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (Deering 2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2020).  
 175. Id. § 1798.192. 
 176. For a review of European scholars’ views on privacy and how it relates to 
social media, see SEBASTIAN SEVIGNANI, PRIVACY AND CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF 
176 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
provide an account to justify privacy pertaining to one’s 
presence in public spaces v. the exposure of one’s image on 
social media. 177 
As William Parent notes, “Privacy is a notoriously 
elusive concept. And the family of concepts to which it 
belongs is extraordinarily rich in complexity.”178 It is 
“significantly vast and complex, extending beyond torts to 
constitutional ‘right to privacy,’ Fourth Amendment law, 
evidentiary privileges, dozens of federal privacy statutes, 
and hundreds of state privacy statutes.”179 
The Justices in Griswold v. Connecticut180 were also 
divided on the underlying source of privacy in U.S. law. One 
author writes: 
Justice Douglas saw privacy in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, 
Justice Goldberg saw it in the Ninth Amendment, and Justice 
Harlan saw it covered by the due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The problem with this kind of defense of the right to 
privacy is that some may not see it all.181 
Studying prominent theoretical analyses of privacy can 
help us grasp why the tort of unwanted broadcasting is well-
suited in the pool of privacy harms. We can begin with 
 
SOCIAL MEDIA 113 (2016). 
 177. In addition to common law privacy torts, a large array of privacy concerns 
are addressed under federal and state statutory law. See, e.g., Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 2033 (1996); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”), 
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 1974 
(“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). These statutes are outside the scope of this 
Article. 
 178. William A. Parent, Privacy: A Brief Survey of the Conceptual Landscape, 
11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 21, 21 (1996). 
 179. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 483 
(2006) (identifying four main rubrics of privacy law: information collection, 
information processing, information dissemination, invasion). 
 180. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 527 (1965) (ruling a ban on 
contraceptives was unconstitutional and noting that “the First Amendment has 
a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion”). 
 181. James H. Moor, The Ethics of Privacy Protection, 39 LIBR. TRENDS 71, 73 
(1990) (arguing for the intrinsic value of privacy). 
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Warren and Brandeis, for whom “The right to life has come 
to mean the right to enjoy life,—the right to be let 
alone . . . .”182 A violation of privacy, in their view, is “a kind 
of spiritual harm.”183 This is the privacy account that was 
widely adopted by courts when Dean Prosser’s article framed 
the four proposed torts. 
 Charles Fried’s theory of privacy, on the other hand, 
focuses on the sense of “control” we ought to have over 
ourselves. For him, privacy is not about secrecy and limiting 
the knowledge of others about ourselves, rather “it is the 
control we have over information about ourselves.”184 
Scholars have argued that Fried’s view on privacy—
control over one’s information—is too narrow.185 For 
example, if one voluntarily divulges personal and intimate 
information about herself, does her control over publication 
of this information mean that she has not relinquished some 
aspects of her privacy? In other words, her control of the 
publication of her personal and intimate information does 
not undermine her relinquishment of her privacy.186  
As Parent described it, “Privacy is the condition of not 
having undocumented personal knowledge about one 
possessed by others.”187 Parent recognizes a moral right to 
privacy for several reasons: (1) “If others manage to obtain 
sensitive personal knowledge about us, they will by that very 
fact acquire power over us,”188 which is undesirable; (2) We 
live in a society “where individuals are generally intolerant 
of life styles, habits, and ways of thinking that differ 
 
 182. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 193. Warren & Brandeis cite Judge 
Cooley for the phrase “to be let alone.” Id. at 195. 
 183. Moor, supra note 181, at 71. 
 184. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968). 
 185. Parent, supra note 178, at 23–24. 
 186. W. A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 
273 (1983). 
 187. Id. at 269. 
 188. Id. at 276. 
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significantly from their own,”189 meaning that they will 
always desire privacy; and (3) “[W]e desire privacy out of 
sincere conviction that there are certain facts about us which 
other people, particularly strangers and casual 
acquaintances, are not entitled to know.”190 
In this view, individuals are “to be respected as 
autonomous, independent being[s] with unique aims to 
fulfill. Parent argues “anyone who deliberately and without 
justification frustrates or contravenes our desire for privacy 
violates the distinctively liberal, moral principles of respect 
for person.”191 
Today, the online world “has provided few gatekeepers to 
safeguard the quality and the nature of our input.”192 We are 
“[e]xposed, watched, recorded, predicted.” “[T]he inability to 
control our intimate information, the sentiment of being 
followed or tracked” is shaping our subjectivity.193 The new 
technology has provoked legal scholars to offer new theories 
for privacy.  
Anita Allen has shifted the right to privacy to a 
responsibility of an individual. 194 This, she argues, is an 
ethical obligation in the age when many have made 
“disclosure the default rule of everyday life.”195 She continues 
to say that “if we are to take normative ethic seriously . . . we 
have to be open to the possibility that some of what we do 
and enjoy doing may not be ethically good or best.”196 Allen 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 277. 
 192. ADAM KLEIN, FANATICISM, RACISM, AND RAGE ONLINE: CORRUPTING THE 
DIGITAL SPHERE 147 (2017). 
 193. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED 217 (2015).  
 194. See Anita L. Allen, An Ethical Duty to Protect One’s Information Privacy? 
64 ALA. L. REV. 845, 846 (2013). 
 195. Id. at 848. 
 196. Id. at 849. 
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places the burden of control over one’s information privacy 
on the individual as a duty owed to oneself. 
Another scholar, Julie Cohen, notes that “freedom from 
surveillance whether public or private, is foundational to the 
practice of informed and reflective citizenship.”197 For Cohen, 
privacy is a dynamic concept that is “shorthand for breathing 
room to engage in the process of boundary management that 
enable[s] and constitute[s] self-development.”198 This 
account is enlightening in explaining the privacy violation 
that unwanted online exposure causes an individual. The 
boundary management account pertains to a social context. 
It is in our relationship with others that the self acts in a 
certain manner. 
The relationship between dignity and its social aspect is 
best described in David Matheson’s work on “dignity and 
selective self-presentation.”199 Matheson describes why an 
account of self-control is insufficient in defining dignity. To 
act with dignity, he explains, “is to present aspects of oneself 
to others in a selective manner, that is to reveal information 
about oneself to different individuals, in different contexts, 
in accord with one’s considered convictions about the 
appropriateness of doing so.”200 Under this theory, “not just 
any self-controlled action is relevant to dignity concern”; 
practical dignity is a social phenomenon.201 By this account, 
too, unwanted exposure on social media platforms is an 
insult to dignity and a form of invasion of privacy, since it 
has the power to “transform an individual’s behavior from 
 
 197. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013).  
 198. Id. at 1906. For more, see JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED 
SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–20, 107–26 (2012). 
 199. David Matheson, Dignity and Selective Self-Presentation, in LESSONS 
FROM THE IDENTITY TRIAL ANONYMITY: PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWOKRED 
SOCIETY 318, 327 (Ian Kerr et al. eds., 2009). 
 200. Id. 
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the nondignified to the undignified by altering the epistemic 
relations carried by the behavior.”202 
Today, the Internet has changed the way we think about 
privacy. This is why the contemporary legal scholarship is 
addressing privacy violations specific to the Internet. This 
Article argues for an account of privacy that is also specific 
to cyberspace. Privacy, however defined, is a notion that 
comes to life in light of people and spaces. Different privacy 
torts—for example, intrusion upon seclusion or 
appropriation of likeness—each try to protect the privacy of 
the individuals either in a designated space or from other 
people. Social media has created a distinct space and 
audience. Therefore, the centrality of “space” and “people” in 
what privacy is, and how privacy torts or regulations protect 
individuals urges us to legitimize a privacy violation when 
imagery of persons is forcefully dragged from its 
geographically physical presence into a cyber-“space”—social 
media platforms—and viewed by “people” in that space 
which has retrievable visibility as its distinct feature. 
Social media platforms are not a space in their natural 
form. Nevertheless, they are distinct cyberspace that one 
may choose to be part of or refrain from. People’s behavior in 
this space is commonly the topic of studies for psychologists 
and anthropologists.203 It has provided scientists a different 
world to analyze. It should also give legal scholars a chance 
to harmonize the individual’s legitimate interests related to 
that space. 
This view requires the abandonment of the strict 
dichotomy of public vs. private. Under the private vs. public 
distinction, a person who steps in the public no longer has 
privacy rights that can stop the use of unwanted 
photography—unless, for the most part, one is a celebrity 
 
 202. Id. at 328. 
 203. See, e.g., Christopher A. Bail et al., Exposure to Opposing Views on Social 
Media Can Increase Political Polarization, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9216 
(2018), https://www.pnas.org/content/115/37/9216. 
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who enjoys the right of publicity. A softer approach to this 
binary distinction can realistically address the emerging 
privacy concerns.204 
In the age of social media, being in the eye of the public 
in a public space is distinguishable from having a presence 
on social media. One’s physical presence in public is limited 
to interactions with those whom one sees or those who have 
the ability to see the individual in person. We have control 
over our interactions, and we plan according to the physical 
geographical space we plan on being part of. For example, in 
parks and streets,205 despite the random unwanted or 
unplanned encounters,206 people can still choose to engage in 
or walk past a protest that is taking place and choose their 
level of engagement. One may change their path or hide 
behind a newspaper (or at least one’s cell phone or tablet) to 
avoid an encounter. If, on the other hand, our picture is taken 
and posted on social media accounts with large numbers of 
users, our autonomy over managing our presence in the 
geographical boundary which we chose is taken away. We 
have been forced into a different space with a different 
number of audiences. 
 
 204. Neil Richards writes that separating private facts and public facts based 
on the method Warren and Brandeis have put forward in their framework is 
sometimes an impossible task as “[i]nformation can be in both categories at once 
. . . or it can lie in the extremely fuzzy area between the two concepts, which are 
themselves poorly defined.” He writes that the distinction poses a problem or the 
free speech doctrine that the later courts, too, have understood “that although 
the line between public and private makes sense in the abstract, it is impossible 
to draw with any confidence or predictability in practice.” NEIL RICHARDS, 
INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 44–45 
(2015). 
 205. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever 
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been 
a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”). 
 206. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 30 (2001) (discussing the benefits of an 
unplanned encounter on a public forum in exposing individuals to different views 
and ideas that they may not otherwise avail themselves of). 
182 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
Social media publications are in an enduring retrievable 
form. As a result, whether in form of face-to-face chitchats, 
when recognized on the street, or receiving e-mails, 
unwanted social media presence consequently results in 
unwanted interactions for an enduring time. Going viral can 
even lead to losing your job.207 Privacy in the context of social 
media means having the right to be in public without 
worrying about appearing as content on someone’s social 
media account. In that regard, our presence in a geographical 
public space does not mean our consent to our presence on an 
online platform. By stepping outside, our privacy in public is 
only lost to the degree required to be present in a 
geographically limited space, unless one consents otherwise. 
In this regard, your privacy has been violated once your 
image is disseminated on social media accounts without your 
consent, subject to certain exceptions,208 and the individual 
should be afforded the right to stop the unwanted 
broadcasting of their image on social media platforms. 
PART III 
A. The Tort of Unwanted Broadcasting 
Technological innovation regularly challenges existing 
legal frameworks. Virtual reality worlds, for example, have 
called for a new way of thinking about the rights and 
obligations of the participants.209 In response to the Internet 
of Things, some have argued for “an internet of torts.” 210 New 
 
 207. See, e.g., Kaelyn Forde, Inside online shaming, and the ‘viral infamy’ that 
follows, ABC NEWS (July 7, 2018, 10:34 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/inside-
online-shaming-viral-infamy/story?id=56200539 (outlining a series of recent 
cases of public shaming via internet); see also Kate Klonick, Re-Shaming the 
Debate: Social Norms, Shame, and Regulation in an Internet Age, 75 MD. L. REV. 
1029, 1030–31, 1049 (2016). 
 208. See infra Part III. 
 209. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom 
to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2043–47 (2004). 
 210. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts, 69 DUKE L. J. (2019) 
(arguing for the expansion of civil liability in light of the internet-connected 
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communications tools likewise create new problems that 
require new solutions. When Warren and Brandeis wrote in 
1890 of “a remedy for the unauthorized circulation of 
portraits of private persons,”211 they could not have imagined 
what “instantaneous photographs”212 would become.  
In light of the widespread use and misuse of social media 
platforms, this Article proposes “the tort of unwanted 
broadcasting.” The injury in this tort is the unwanted 
widespread broadcast of one’s image or video recording on 
social media platforms with enduring retrievable visibility 
which forces presence in a distinct space one does not wish 
to be, that is, cyberspace.213 People have “a greater 
expectation of privacy in places where only a few people can 
see or hear them. . . . [P]eople quite reasonably adapt their 
self-presentation efforts according to their assessment of who 
can observe them.”214 When one’s image is broadcasted on 
social media platforms, the individual’s autonomy in self 
presentation is shattered. The tort of unwanted broadcasting 
addresses the unwanted exposure and can be categorized as 
a “communications tort—a category of legal causes of actions 
in which people are harmed by speech acts of others that are 
not otherwise protected by the First Amendment.”215 
 
devices that constitute the Internet of Things). 
 211. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 195. 
 212. Id. (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded 
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”). 
 213. Legal scholars have written on the distinctness of cyberspace and have 
argued for the “conceiving of Cyberspace as a distinct ‘place’ for purposes of legal 
analysis by recognizing a legally significant border between Cyberspace and the 
‘real world.’” David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law 
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (1996). The distinctness of the 
cyberspace, I believe, is also intuitive. We know it has become a different world 
when, for example, you can find a grandmother or an old uncle who has little 
understanding of how it functions. 
 214. N. A. Moreham, Privacy in Public Places, 65 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 606, 622 
(2006). 
 215. Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. 
REV. 63, 73 (2014). 
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For better or for worse, there is no binding legal 
definition of what social media is to this date. However, it is 
helpful to depict the ways courts have been addressing social 
media in their opinions. This is especially important since 
this paper argues the specific nature of social media calls for 
its own tort—one that can unify the heterogeneous field of 
privacy lawsuits pertaining to social media accounts and 
misuse of images. 
One Supreme Court case which dealt with social media 
was Packingham v. North Carolina.216 In this case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed the relationship between the First 
Amendment and the modern internet.217 A North Carolina 
law made it a felony for a registered sex offender to use social 
media networks.218 The law defined commercial social 
networking websites by setting out four criteria: 
(1) Is operated by a person who derives revenue from membership 
fees, advertising, or other sources related to the operation of the 
Web site. 
(2) Facilitates the social introduction between two or more persons 
for the purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or 
information exchanges. 
(3) Allows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that 
contain information such as the name or nickname of the user, 
photographs placed on the personal Web page by the user, other 
personal information about the user, and links to other personal 
Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends 
or associates of the user that may be accessed by other users or 
visitors to the Web site. 
 
 216. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017). 
 217. Id. at 1736. 
 218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5(a) (2017) (“It is unlawful for a sex offender who 
is registered in accordance with Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes 
to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows 
that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain 
personal Web pages on the commercial social networking website.”). 
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(4) Provides users or visitors to the commercial social networking 
Web site mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a 
message board, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messenger.219 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, declared the 
law unconstitutional in light of First Amendment values and 
noted: 
[T]o foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user 
from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. 
It is unsettling to suggest that only a limited set of websites can be 
used even by persons who have completed their sentences. Even 
convicted criminals—and in some instances especially convicted 
criminals—might receive legitimate benefits from these means for 
access to the world of ideas, in particular if they seek to reform and 
to pursue lawful and rewarding lives.220 
The Court, however, did not define social media. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Thomas, voiced the concern that the 
majority’s language “is bound to be interpreted by some to 
mean that the States are largely powerless to restrict even 
the most dangerous sexual predators from visiting any 
internet sites, including, for example, teenage dating sites 
and sites designed to permit minors to discuss personal 
problems with their peers.”221 For Justice Alito, the North 
Carolina law was not a content-neutral “time, place, or 
manner” restriction that was narrowly tailored to serve a 
legitimate government interest.222 He deemed it too broad 
since the four elements the law gives in providing a definition 
for social media networks also included “a large number of 
 
 219. Id. § 14-202.5(b)(1)-(4). 
 220. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. 
 221. Id. at 1738. 
 222. Id. at 1739 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781 (1989)); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (“[E]ven in a public forum 
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner 
of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Community 
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))). 
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websites that are most unlikely to facilitate the commission 
of a sex crime against a child.”223 Justice Alito observes that 
“As the law at issue here shows, it is not easy to provide a 
precise definition of a ‘social media’ site, and the Court 
makes no effort to do so.”224 
Lower courts have tried to define the platforms when 
needed. In People v. Lopez,225 the California Court of Appeal 
relied on the Oxford dictionary to determine the meaning of 
“social media.” The court wrote that despite a lack of a 
definitive legal definition, “a practical, acceptable, and 
common-sense definition of the term does exist.”226 
Therefore, defining social media platforms for the purposes 
of the tort of unwanted broadcasting will not constitute a 
problem. Courts have an understanding of the concept and 
can enforce the tort when called upon. 
Who, in the event of widespread online dissemination, is 
the tortfeasor and can be held liable? Anyone who has 
intentionally and without the consent of the subject 
published the content—a photo or a video recording—on an 
 
 223. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1741 (Alito, J., concurring) (providing examples 
such as Amazon.com and WebMD that fit within the definition of North 
Carolina’s statute). 
 224. Id. at 1743 n.16. 
 225. People v. Lopez, No. H041713, 2016 WL 297942, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 
25, 2016). 
 226. Id. (“According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘social media’ constitutes 
‘websites and applications which enable users to create and share content or to 
participate in social networking.’” (quoting Social media, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183739?redirectedFrom=social+ 
media#eid272386371(last visited Nov. 17, 2019))). In turn, “social networking” is 
defined as “the use or establishment of social networks or connections; (now esp.) 
the use of websites which enable users to interact with one another, find and 
contact people with common interest, etc.” Social networking, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183739?redirectedFrom=social+ 
networking#eid139354807 (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). And “social network” is 
defined as “a system of social interactions and relationships; a group of people 
who are socially connected to one another; (now also) a social networking website; 
the users of such a website collectively.” Social network, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183739?redirectedFrom=social+ 
network#eid139354802 (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). 
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online public platform can be held liable.227 However, to limit 
the floodgate of lawsuits, an additional element of the tort 
requires that the content reach, or be capable of reaching, a 
large audience. For example, an online user who has 50 
followers and publishes a video of an individual without 
consent would not face liability. Admittedly, there is no 
precise line to draw on this issue. Instead, a court should 
consider the significance of a certain publication for the 
person whose image is being published; its bandwidth; and 
whether a reasonable person may find the online post widely 
publicized. These criteria are non-exclusive and aim to only 
provide a guideline for the courts.228 
If the subject can prove that she does not have any 
picture of herself available online, not even one picture, in 
that case, regardless of the size of the audience, the 
unwanted publication of her picture online should satisfy the 
tort of unwanted broadcasting. In this case, one is too many. 
This approach allows for preventing further privacy breaches 
with undesired consequences, such as the one allegedly 
committed by Clearview AI.229 
What is the outcome of a successful lawsuit? The plaintiff 
will be entitled to enjoin the defendant to take down the 
original post. She will also be able to ask the court for 
damages depending on the magnitude of the dissemination 
and whether it involves additional socially problematic 
behaviors such as mocking or shaming that target dignitary 
 
 227. According to the Stored Communication Act of 1986, private messages and 
posts are not accessible by parties without the consent of the publisher. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2702(b) (2012); see also Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court, 417 P.3d 725, 728 (Cal. 
2018) (recognizing the right for defendant to subpoena the public information on 
social media platform, while requiring consent of the author based on SCA to 
subpoena private messages). 
 228. German courts have incorporated the size of the audience in their judicial 
decisions on privacy. For the German courts, “The larger the 
audience/readership, the more the scales will tip towards an injury to 
personality.” PATRICK O’CALLAGHAN, REFINING PRIVACY IN TORT LAW 118 (2013). 
 229. See supra Introduction. 
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interests—both of which have no clear-cut legal remedy in 
our current tort system.230 
The Second Restatement of Torts notes that “liability 
clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, 
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”231 For 
insults, dignitaries, and similar behaviors, the Restatement 
calls on individuals to be “hardened to a certain amount of 
rough language.”232 However, when coupled with a post 
online on social media, those same behaviors are aggravated 
and should not be ignored. As one author rightly points out, 
“Information speech restrictions like the right to be forgotten 
are appealing because they speak to a new collective 
danger . . . in going about your daily life, your actions might 
suddenly be held under a microscope, or broadcast to the 
world, and replayed on infinite loop.”233 The tort of unwanted 
broadcasting can also address this doctrinal void wrongfully 
justified by calling to be tough. 
This tort also works to address in part the shortcomings 
of the U.S. Communication Decency Act § 230(c).234 As 
 
 230. Despite the recognitions of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(IIED), the high bar to satisfy the tort—an outrageous act— has left many 
uncompensated. See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark.), appeal 
dismissed, 138 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting an IIED claim and noting that 
the sexual advances made by President Bill Clinton did not amount to 
“outrageous” conduct to satisfy the tort of IIED). 
 231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Klonick, supra note 207, at 1061. 
 234.  
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable 
on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers 
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally 
protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict 
access to material described in paragraph (1). 
47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(2) (West 2019). 
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interpreted by the courts, this widely criticized statute235 
inverts the traditional common law “republication rule,”236 
eliminating it for ISPs.237 By virtue of this statute, one who 
owns or operates a website, and posts a defamatory 
statement or image initially authored or captured by 
someone else cannot be held liable.238 While a discussion of 
the shortcomings of § 230(c) are beyond the scope of this 
piece, it clearly leaves open the possibility of liability being 
imposed on the original author or publisher. Hence, the tort 
of unwanted broadcasting can apply to the original publisher 
of an image or video recording. 
In reality, finding the original publisher is not easy. The 
original author of the publication may hide behind a fake 
name and identity. And, while a plaintiff may ask a court to 
subpoena the social media platform (or ISP) to release the 
identity of the publisher,239 such a procedure is both costly 
and limited in its effectiveness.240 This is not to say the tort 
 
 235. See, e.g., Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 
203, 208 (2018) (“The CDA immunity doctrine, born over two decades ago, is at 
odds with the world as it is today. Internet intermediaries are structuring online 
content, conduct, and the entire networked environment in ways that the current 
doctrine does not contemplate. The consequences of this failing are troubling and 
require reform.”); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will 
Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
401, 401–04 (2017); Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Monsanto Lecture: Online 
Defamation, Legal Concepts, and The Good Samaritan, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 
(2016) (calling for a closer look at tort law principles in libel law—specifically the 
republication rule—in regulating speech and interpreting 230(c) that would not 
result in total immunity). 
 236. Sylvain, supra note 235, at 211–12. 
 237. See Zipursky, supra note 235, at 4 (noting that based on the common law 
republication rule “a speaker who writes or speaks a defamatory statement made 
by another is liable as if he or she were the speaker herself”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 238. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability 
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this 
section.”).  
 239. TUGENDHAT & CHRISTIE, supra note 12, at 774. 
 240. Anonymous speech is a guaranteed First Amendment right which also 
applies to an online speech. See Anonymous Online Speakers v. U.S. Dist. Court, 
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of unwanted broadcasting is unable to redress the privacy 
violation; however, its limited scope removes the worry of a 
floodgate of lawsuits. 
B. Exceptions 
1. The First Amendment 
Internet broadly, and social media platforms specifically, 
have provided numerous platforms for speech of any kind, 
including cheap speech which “may be used to attack, harass, 
and silence as much as it is used to illuminate or debate. And 
the use of speech as a tool to suppress speech is, by its nature, 
something very challenging for the First Amendment to deal 
with.”241 Nevertheless, American exceptionalism on free 
speech provides an obstacle in proposing any form of 
limitation on speech. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
the First Amendment provides strong protection to any 
speech that fits the broad definition of “newsworthy.” 
 
661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the right is not unlimited and “the 
degree of scrutiny varies depending on the circumstances and the type of speech 
at issue.” Id. While political speech has the highest degree of protection, id. (citing 
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 417 (1988)), other purely private speech, including 
defamatory speech or commercial speech, enjoys a lesser degree of protection. See, 
e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) 
(holding that purely private speech, such as commercial speech, enjoys a lower 
level First Amendment protection). There is no consensus on the requirements 
necessary to unmask the identity of an online speaker and the courts’ power in 
issuing subpoenas. See, e.g., Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770 
S.E.2d 440, 445 (Va. 2015) (holding that the circuit court was not empowered to 
enforce a non-party subpoena duces tecum which directed Yelp to produce 
documents located in California for a defamation action brought in Virginia). It 
therefore remains a question for the courts to decide whether the degree of harm 
in each case of unwanted broadcasting outweighs the required protection for 
anonymous speech. For a discussion of the level of privacy afforded to social 
media communications and posts, see Brian Mund, Social Media Searches and 
the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 239 (2018) 
(describing how the current law affords no reasonable expectation of privacy to 
social media communications based on third-party doctrine). Mund argues for a 
stronger Fourth Amendment requirement to protect citizens from baseless 
searches of social media profiles. 
 241. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547, 549 
(2018). 
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In New York Times v. Sullivan,242 the court announced 
that tort law regulations on speech (specifically the tort of 
defamation) are in nature state-action restrictions on free 
speech that are subject to the First Amendment. The 
dominant “marketplace of ideas”243 conception, and case law 
following New York Times v. Sullivan, have left little space 
for unprotected speech.244 In addition to public officials and 
general-purpose public figures, the limited-purpose public 
figure has further made it difficult for individuals to sue for 
speech torts in the U.S. Recently, Justice Clarence Thomas 
raised the concern of the scope of the First Amendment 
application245 following the dismissal of a defamation case by 
Kathrine Mae McKee, who sued Bill Cosby for defamation.246 
In this climate, would the tort of unwanted broadcasting 
create a limitation on speech contrary to the First 
Amendment free speech doctrine? Two cases discussing the 
privacy tort of publication of private facts provide a 
background for determining a balance between the First 
Amendment doctrine on free speech and the privacy tort 
proposed in this paper. 
 In the first case, Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Supreme 
Court held in favor of publication of the name of a rape victim 
 
 242. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964). 
 243. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.”); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 
(1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); 
Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
 244. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding that the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not allow public figures to recover damages 
for the IIED tort without showing actual malice). Some courts have held social 
media users with large numbers of followers to be public figures. Cristina 
Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE. L.J. 1320, 1395 n.357 (2017). 
 245. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 675–76 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 246. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Clarence Thomas Has a Point About Free-
Speech Law, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ 
articles/2019-02-21/clarence-thomas-has-a-point-about-free-speech.  
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in a newspaper.247 The Florida Star newspaper had obtained 
the name of the rape victim through the public police report 
available at the Sheriff’s Department.248 The tension in the 
lawsuit was between an individual’s right to privacy against 
the publication of private information and the First 
Amendment right accorded to the press. Declining to rule a 
categorical judgment that would render any truthful 
publication permissible,249 the court narrowed down the 
question to and held that “where a newspaper publishes 
truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, 
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when 
narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.”250 
In the second notable case, Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc., the author of a book called “The Promised Land: The 
Great Black Migration and How It Changed America” 
revealed information about Haynes and his wife that they 
considered private.251 The information included paragraphs 
about the plaintiffs’ sex life, heavy drinking habits, laziness 
and more. Relying on the implications of Florida Star, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals expanded on the 
newsworthiness element.252 Despite the humiliation the 
publication brought about for the plaintiffs, the court 
rejected plaintiffs’ claim and held that the information was 
newsworthy. The court opined: 
People who do not desire the limelight and do not deliberately 
choose a way of life or course of conduct calculated to thrust them 
into it nevertheless have no legal right to extinguish it if the 
experiences that have befallen them are newsworthy, even if they 
would prefer that those experiences be kept private.253 
 
 247. 491 U.S. 524, 540–41 (1989). 
 248. Id. at 524. 
 249. Id. at 532.  
 250. Id. at 541. 
 251. 8 F.3d 1222, 1224–26 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 252. Id. at 1232. 
 253. Id. 
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In these two cases, and other similar cases,254 when 
deciding between privacy torts and the First Amendment, 
the Court has ruled in favor of free speech.255 However, there 
is a balancing test that courts take into consideration: the 
newsworthiness criterium. Categorically limiting the scope 
of privacy torts in favor of free speech means leaving wrongs 
unredressed, whereas balancing the two by separating what 
is newsworthy or of legitimate public concern can better 
serve the society as a whole.256 This is especially true in the 
Internet Age, where privacy violations have reached a whole 
different level as discussed in the Introduction. 
 Similarly, newsworthy content cannot be protected by 
the tort of unwanted broadcasting and falls outside of its 
realm. The proposed tort seeks to protect ordinary people’s 
images from unwanted broadcasting. Therefore, it does not 
violate the First Amendment doctrine on speech as long as 
the shared image is not newsworthy. 
2. Other Exceptions 
The tort of unwanted broadcasting may give rise to 
concerns that such tort will have a chilling effect on 
recordings and publications that try to promote social 
responsibility and respectable behavior. Research shows that 
“[w]hen individuals believe, rightly or wrongly, that their 
 
 254. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (ruling 
in favor of free speech by unanimously rejecting the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim of a public figure); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 
443, 454–59 (2011) (rejecting the plaintiff’s IIED and invasion of privacy by 
intrusion upon seclusion claims, among other claims, based on the First 
Amendment doctrine, and ruling that picketing in front of a deceased military 
member’s funeral was of public concern and therefore entitled to First 
Amendment protections); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1975) 
(ruling in favor of a newspaper that had published a rape victim’s name). 
 255. NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 49 (2015). 
 256. In stating the tort of public disclosure of private facts, the Restatement 
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acts won’t be attributed to them personally, they become less 
concerned about social convictions.”257 To avoid the possible 
chilling effect of social accountability, the tort of unwanted 
broadcasting comes with its exceptions:  
a. Police officers and public officials cannot have a claim to 
this tort when performing their duties; being under scrutiny 
is part of the officers’ official roles. Recording police while on 
duty or posting their pictures on social media accounts is 
protected by the First Amendment right to free speech and 
press as observed in Fields v. City of Philadelphia. 258 
b. Individuals who are photographed or filmed engaged in 
criminal activity in public cannot enjoy this privacy 
protection. The protection of law does not extend to outlaws. 
Therefore, if a person is recorded or pictured while engaging 
in an illegal activity, they may not invoke the tort of 
unwanted broadcasting to stop the dissemination of their 
image on social media platforms. 
c. Artistic creations supported by the Copy Rights Act of 
1976 and relevant laws are do not fall under the penumbra 
of this tort.259 This will ensure there is no chilling effect on 
artistic expression. 
d. A user claiming innocent dissemination cannot be held 
liable. I am borrowing the phrase “innocent dissemination” 
from the English law defense as outlined in Defamation Act 
1996.260 Section one of the act provides that a person has a 
defense if he shows: “(a) he was not the author,261 editor or 
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publisher of the statement complained of, (b) he took 
reasonable care in relation to its publication, and (c) he did 
not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did 
caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory 
statement.”262 Similar balancing factors can be used in the 
online publication of the image or video clip in the tort of 
unwanted broadcasting. 
e. The tort should also be confined to wide publication on 
platforms society considers social media. It is important to 
distinguish social media from the rest of the functions of the 
internet. As noted at the outset of this Article, an image 
distributed via social media platforms becomes viewable for 
an unprecedented number of people with the use of a single 
hashtag. There is nothing inherently wrong with this 
feature. Many positive social movements and protests that 
have benefited societies, such as #MeToo, are recognized by 
this very feature—hashtag activism.263 However, the harm 
that can be caused is just as powerful, and the tort of 
unwanted broadcasting mitigates these harms. 
If tort law is to keep its regulatory role, a limited degree 
of restrictions must be tolerated. Otherwise, “[t]he only way 
to be sure tort liability does not deter speech is to abolish it 
in all cases in which the harm results from speech,”264 which 
is not a proposition worth fighting for. Tort law works in the 
field of recognizing harms and redressing them by providing 
an avenue to sue when one has been wronged. In a society 
where “exposure is the norm, rather than the exception,” 
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recognizing a tort for wrongful dissemination feels like 
swimming against the current.265 Yet, the unwanted use of 
an individual’s photographs protected by the tort of 
unwanted broadcasting incentivizes a higher degree of care 
on social media platforms while allowing for the platform 
and its user to enjoy its positive outcomes. The benefits of 
this narrow limitation outweigh the cost of restriction placed 
on individuals not to use another person’s images without 
their consent. 
CONCLUSION 
With the advancement of technology, the line between 
what is public and what is private has become thin. In 
Warren and Brandeis’s words, “That the individual shall 
have full protection in person and in property is a principle 
as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary 
from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent 
of such protection.”266 We are now at a time where we need 
to look at the meaning of our physical presence in public and 
the privacy the law affords us.  
Today, promoting economic or political agendas or 
spending leisure time by exposing individuals’ images and 
video recordings on social media platforms are the 
unpleasant consequences of this new digital age. The 
unwanted spread of video recordings and pictures of private 
individuals through social media platforms which allow for a 
retrievable visibility is a new privacy violation that needs to 
be addressed effectively. Being physically present in public 
and expecting the forgoing of a certain degree of privacy by 
mere presence in public is one thing; allowing one’s image to 
be publicized through the eye of millions for an indefinite 
time, retrievable at any time, is another. This article, 
building on common law of torts and its privacy 
developments, proposed the tort of unwanted broadcasting 
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and sought to legitimize the grievance of retrievable 
visibility. With its exceptions laid out in this article, the 
proposed tort also promotes a culture of responsibility 
amongst social media users. 
